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JURISDICTION 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an Order denying the defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 73-75; Addendum A) the plaintiffs' complaint on jurisdictional grounds. The 
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter one over which the Utah Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0)(Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Does the failure to direct and deliver a notice of claim to the Utah Attorney 
General at his office violate the Utah Governmental Immunity Act? 
Standard of Review: This Court "review[s] the district court's denial of 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss for correctness, granting no deference to the district 
court's ruling." Pendleton v. State Bar, 2000 UT 96, p, 16 P.3d 1230. 
II. Does the failure to strictly comply with the notice of claim provision of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act deny the trial court subject matter jurisdiction? 
Standard of Review: This Court "review[s] the district court's denial of 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss for correctness, granting no deference to the district 
court's ruling." Pendleton v. State Bar. 2000 UT 96, f 5, 16 P.3d 1230. 
The defendant raised and preserved both issues in its Motion to Dismiss (R. 17-
30), which the trial court denied (R. 73-75; Addendum A). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
All relevant text of statutes and rules pertinent to the issues before the court is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-2(9) is determinative and reads in relevant part as 
follows: 
As used in this chapter: 
"State" means the state of Utah, and includes 
any office, department, agency, authority, 
commission, board, institution, hospital, college 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-11(2) is determinative and reads in relevant part as 
follows: 
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental 
entity.. . shall file a notice of claim . . . before maintaining an 
act ion. . . . 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(E) is determinative and reads in 
relevant part as follows: 
The notice of claim be: 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(E) The attorney general, when the claim is 
against the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The plaintiffs, Donald T. and Rita Wills ("the Wills"), were injured on December 
20, 2000, as a result of an automobile/train collision with the defendant Heber Valley 
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Historic Railroad ("the Railroad") (R. 3-7). On June 21,2001, the Wills sent a notice of 
claim to: "Attorney General, State of Utah, 160 East 300 South, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84114-0873" (R. 17-21). The Attorney General himself is not officed at this 
location. On November 30,2001, the Wills filed their Complaint and served it upon the 
Attorney General at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on December 5,2001, 
where his office is located (R. 3-10;14-16). 
On December 21, 2001, the Railroad filed its Motion to Dismiss (R. 17-30), 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the trial court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Wills had failed to comply with the notice 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("the Immunity Act") see Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(E). On January 30,2002, the trial court heard argument (R. 72) 
and concluded: (1) the case would not be dismissed on a technicality, and (2) because the 
statute does not name the Attorney General specifically, sending the notice of claim to a 
division within the Attorney General's office constitutes compliance with the Immunity 
Act. 
The Order denying the Motion to Dismiss was entered on February 8, 2002 (R. 73-
75; Addendum A). The Railroad filed a timely Petition for Interlocutory Appeal which 
was granted on April 17, 2002. The Wills then filed a Motion for Summary Disposition 
on April 25,2002. This Court deferred decision on the Motion for Summary Disposition 
by order dated on May 14, 2002. 
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II. Statement of Relevant Facts 
The only facts relevant to the issue before the Court for decision are the procedural 
facts stated above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying the Railroad's Motion to Dismiss. As a 
precondition to suit against the state of Utah or one of it agencies, a notice of claim must 
be served upon the Attorney General. A notice of claim addressed to "Attorney General," 
but delivered to a remote division within his office does not meet the Immunity Act's 
requirements. 
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(E) requires that a 
notice of claim be directed and delivered to the Attorney General. Implicit in this 
language is that the notice of claim be delivered to the Attorney General, the actual 
officeholder, at his physical address, and not to an unnamed or random, division within a 
satellite office. To conclude otherwise would defeat the purpose of the Immunity Act and 
violate the legislative intent to create a central and singular recipient for all notices of 
claim filed against the state of Utah, or its agencies. This result follows logically and 
consistently from the line of cases requiring strict compliance with the Immunity Act. 
The trial court's incorrect conclusion that the Wills complied with the notice of 
claim requirement must be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATUTORY DIRECTION CONTAINED IN THE 
IMMUNITY ACT IS UNAMBIGUOUS; THE PURPOSE 
IS CLEAR. 
A court's primary objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language of the statute, and in light of the 
purpose the statute was meant to achieve. State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, ^ [19,37 P.3d 
1103. The notice of claim provision is unambiguous, mandatory and directive. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(E). It specifies to whom the notice of claim is to be 
directed and delivered. In a recent case, this Court stated that when interpreting a statute, 
a court determines the statute's meaning first by looking to its plain language, and then by 
giving effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous. Blackner v. State of 
Utah. 2002 UT 44, Tfl2,446 Utah Adv. Rep. 31. Nothing in the Immunity Act's notice 
provision is ambiguous. The plain language instructs a claimant to direct and deliver a 
notice of claim to the Attorney General. Delivery of a notice of claim to the offices of 
assistant attorneys general is not compliance with the plain meaning of the Immunity Act. 
The Immunity Act establishes a systematic means of receiving and reviewing 
claims against governmental entities. It permits a claimant to initiate a lawsuit only after 
he or she follows its requirements, which include filing a notice of claim within one year 
of the incident giving rise to the claim, filing an undertaking contemporaneous with his or 
her complaint, and directing and delivering a notice of claim to the Attorney General. 
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The Act's purpose is obvious-to control the receipt of notices of claim by centralizing 
and directing who may receive, and process, the claim. The Attorney General acts like a 
registered agent for a corporation-he is the only legal counsel for all state entities, and 
therefore, may and does direct claims and litigation on behalf of his clients. It is the 
Attorney General himself who must be served rather than a random office or division. As 
this Court stated there is no confusion as to "how, what, when and to whom a party must 
direct a Notice " Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 2001 UT 109, ^ [15, 37 P.3d 1156. 
The notice of claim must be directed to the Attorney General and delivered to him; 
both components of the statute must be met in order for the Immunity Act's requirements 
to be satisfied. 
II. THERE IS NO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
WITHOUT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
IMMUNITY ACT. 
Compliance with the notice of claim provision of the Immunity Act confers 
subject-matter jurisdiction upon the trial court. In other words, the proper filing of a 
notice of claim is a precondition to suit. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 
1988); Lamarr v. Utah Dep't. of Trans.. 828 P.535, 540 (Utah App. 1992). This Court 
has repeatedly held that failure to strictly comply with the statutory notice provision of the 
Act results in the litigation's dismissal. In Greene, this Court affirmed the trial court's 
dismissal of the suit, holding that "Utah law mandates strict compliance with the 
Immunity Act." Greene, 2001 UT 109, f 12. Likewise, in Brown v. Utah Transit 
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Authority, 2002 UT 15, 440 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, a notice of claim received by a transit 
authority employee was deemed defective because it was sent to the wrong office of the 
transit authority, and once again the Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal. Finally, in 
Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16,40 P.3d 632, the trial court dismissed the complaint 
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction even though the plaintiffs had provided notice to all 
three county commissioners, receipt of which was acknowledged by a county employee, 
but not the county clerk as the statute required. This Court again affirmed the dismissal 
of the litigation on jurisdictional grounds, stating that: 
in conformity with our long established jurisprudence 
construing the statute- and with our recent interpretation 
of the 1998 amendment in Greene- we reiterate today that 
the Immunity Act demands strict compliance with its 
requirements to allow suit against governmental entities. 
The notice of claim provision, particularly, neither 
contemplates nor allows for anything less. 
Wheeler, 2002 UT 16,^13. 
This Court has made clear through its established line of cases that strict 
compliance with the Immunity Act is mandated and failure to so comply denies the trial 
court subject-matter jurisdiction, thus requiring dismissal of the litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
The plain language of the Immunity Act's notice provisions directs how, when, 
where and to whom a notice of claim is to be served. In claims involving the state of 
Utah or its agencies, the notice of claim must be directed and delivered to the Attorney 
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General himself. The Immunity Act does not specify an office within the Attorney 
General's office because it is the officeholder himself who must receive notice. 
Substitute service is not acceptable. 
In a series of recent cases, this Court has concluded and reiterated that a claimant 
must strictly comply with the notice requirements of the Immunity Act. Delivery to the 
wrong office or to the wrong person is not considered compliance, and without 
compliance, the trial court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a case. 
Given the recent and compelling precedents from this Court, the trial court's denial 
of the Railroad's Motion to Dismiss must be reversed, and the litigation dismissed for 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
DATED this ./1 ~ day of June, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT 
NANCY L. KEMP 
Assistant Utah Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J3 day of June, 2002,1 caused to be served by U.S. 
Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT to the following: 
Samuel D. McVey 
Lorin C. Barker 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
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ADDENDUM A 
Samuel D. McVey (#4083) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD T. WILLS and RITA WILLS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HEBER VALLEY HISTORIC RAILROAD 
AUTHORITY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 010500542 
The Court, having carefully considered the memoranda, evidence and oral argument of 
counsel on this matter, 
WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Complaint is denied. //u"^ ®&/JS 
DATED this? X V . d a W 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Akk k *l 
Sandra L. Steinvoort 
Counsel For Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this pOday of January, 2002,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT to be mailed through United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Sandra L. Steinvoort 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
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